| 摘要: | 近年來標準必要專利訴訟，例如Microsoft v. Motorola案、Huawei v. ZTE案、Qualcomm案等，乃國際間所關注之焦點。而各國之行政與司法部門所為之裁決，莫不影響著企業之專利布局與技術領先地位，以及全球經濟與產業之發展。然而，探究該等訴訟之內容，除了案件複雜性甚高之外，其中更涉及鉅額權利金之判斷，禁制令核發之標準，以及企業對自由競爭市場之影響。
本文將以標準必要專利為主題，依序探討標準與專利結合之原因、標準必要專利所挾帶之風險、標準制定組織如何預防採行標準必要專利所產生之問題、專利權人於接受標準制定組織之智慧財產政策後，其所為的F/RAND授權承諾性質為何、權利金又是如何計算。此外，在標準必要專利權人負有授權義務的情況下，專利權人是否尚得行使專利排他權而請求禁制令、各國對於標準必要專利案件之禁制令核發門檻有無不同、以及標準必要專利與競爭法之關連。
Standard essential patents cases such as Microsoft v. Motorola, Huawei v. ZTE and FTC v. Qualcomm have become focuses concerned by world in recent years. The decisions made by administrative and judicial departments of each country not only affect the enterprise’s patent strategy and the leadership of technology, but also the development of global economy and industry. These standard essential patents cases are taken seriously by international because of their complex background, huge royalties, factor of injunction, and the impact of world market.
This essay will focus on standard essential patents and study the factors for the combination of standards and patents, the risks of essential patents and how the standard-setting organizations prevent the problems of essential patents from occurring. Besides, what the legal basis of the F/RAND commitment is and how the reasonable royalties will be calculated once the patentee accepts the intellectual property policy regulated by the standard-setting organizations. Can the patentee claims the patent right and asks an injunction under the F/RAND commitment? Are there any differences in factor of injunction about standard essential patents cases in the different countries? What is the relationship between standard essential patents and Competition Law？ These issues will be discussed in subsequent chapters. |
