本研究探討美國一般產業之績效欠佳經理人之投資行為，研究其與研發費用增加之關係，以及其於研發計劃後，對公司長期績效與風險之影響，研究期間為1992至2021。本研究發現績效欠佳經理人會支出較多研發費用，即其風險容忍程度較高，且較易選擇超額風險的投資計劃，本研究亦發現研發費用增加效果，對於績效欠佳經理人股權激勵誘因高者不會較強，但對於其公司處於高科技產業則效果較強。對於未來公司績效與風險方面，本研究發現，對於績效欠佳經理人於增加較多研發費用之後，其五年內之公司績效與風險皆顯著增加，而且，本研究發現，由於研發費用增加所帶來之未來公司績效與風險增加效果，對於績效欠佳經理人股權激勵誘因高者，以及其公司處於高科技產業者之效果更強。最後，本研究發現績效欠佳經理人且研發費用支出較多者，其經理人績效排名改善較多。本研究之結果，不僅對於探討績效欠佳經理人於實行研發計劃時，其風險承擔之行為與未來公司績效與風險之改變提供學術貢獻，亦提供政府及實務界有意義的經理人特徵與風險管理意涵。
This study explores the behavior of underperforming chief executive officers (CEOs) in the increase of R&D expenditures and their influence on long-term performance and risk following R&D increases in U.S. industrial firms from 1992 to 2021. We find that underperforming CEOs spend more on R&D, implying that higher risk tolerance for investment projects with excessive risk. We also find that the R&D increase effect is not stronger for underperforming CEOs with high equity incentives but is stronger for underperforming firms in high-tech industries. For firm performance and risk in the following five years, we indicate that both rise significantly for underperforming CEOs with high R&D expenditures. The firm performance and risk effects after R&D increases are stronger for underperforming CEOs with high equity incentives and underperforming firms in high-tech industries. Finally, we find that CEO rankings improve more for underperforming CEOs following R&D activities in the long-term. Overall, this study offers government and firms useful knowledge about CEO underperformance associated with risk-taking behavior and the changes in firm performance and risk from innovative activities.
