文化大學機構典藏 CCUR:Item 987654321/51376
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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/51376


    Title: 經理人績效欠佳與研發計畫之關係
    Ceo Underperformance and Innovative Projects
    Authors: 聶瑋瑩
    Contributors: 國際貿易學系
    Keywords: 經理人績效欠佳
    風險承擔
    研發費用
    股權激勵
    高科技產業
    CEO underperformance
    risk-taking
    R&D expenditures
    CEO equity incentive
    High-tech industries.
    Date: 2021
    Issue Date: 2023-03-07 13:01:10 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究探討美國一般產業之績效欠佳經理人之投資行為,研究其與研發費用增加之關係,以及其於研發計劃後,對公司長期績效與風險之影響,研究期間為1992至2021。本研究發現績效欠佳經理人會支出較多研發費用,即其風險容忍程度較高,且較易選擇超額風險的投資計劃,本研究亦發現研發費用增加效果,對於績效欠佳經理人股權激勵誘因高者不會較強,但對於其公司處於高科技產業則效果較強。對於未來公司績效與風險方面,本研究發現,對於績效欠佳經理人於增加較多研發費用之後,其五年內之公司績效與風險皆顯著增加,而且,本研究發現,由於研發費用增加所帶來之未來公司績效與風險增加效果,對於績效欠佳經理人股權激勵誘因高者,以及其公司處於高科技產業者之效果更強。最後,本研究發現績效欠佳經理人且研發費用支出較多者,其經理人績效排名改善較多。本研究之結果,不僅對於探討績效欠佳經理人於實行研發計劃時,其風險承擔之行為與未來公司績效與風險之改變提供學術貢獻,亦提供政府及實務界有意義的經理人特徵與風險管理意涵。
    This study explores the behavior of underperforming chief executive officers (CEOs) in the increase of R&D expenditures and their influence on long-term performance and risk following R&D increases in U.S. industrial firms from 1992 to 2021. We find that underperforming CEOs spend more on R&D, implying that higher risk tolerance for investment projects with excessive risk. We also find that the R&D increase effect is not stronger for underperforming CEOs with high equity incentives but is stronger for underperforming firms in high-tech industries. For firm performance and risk in the following five years, we indicate that both rise significantly for underperforming CEOs with high R&D expenditures. The firm performance and risk effects after R&D increases are stronger for underperforming CEOs with high equity incentives and underperforming firms in high-tech industries. Finally, we find that CEO rankings improve more for underperforming CEOs following R&D activities in the long-term. Overall, this study offers government and firms useful knowledge about CEO underperformance associated with risk-taking behavior and the changes in firm performance and risk from innovative activities.
    Appears in Collections:[Department of International Trade 7 Graduate Institute of International Trade ] project

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