本研究在於探討企業聲譽與家族控制對高階管理者超額薪酬之影響，研究中將高管薪酬區分為固定與激勵兩部分，研究樣本為台灣證券交易所上市(櫃)非金融產業公司，實證期間從2011至2014年。
實證結果顯示，企業聲譽較高之公司會發給高階管理者較多超額激勵薪酬與較少固定超額薪酬。另外，本研究發現，家族控制對企業聲譽與高階管理者超額激勵薪酬有負向干擾作用，亦即在家族控制企業內，企業聲譽對高階管理者超額激勵薪酬之影響較低。
This study aims to examine the impact of company reputation and family control on excess executive compensation, as well as whether family control alters the relationship between reputation and excess executive compensation. To conduct this research, executive compensation is classified as fixed and incentive ones. Our sample is non-financial firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Taipei Exchange in the period from 2011 to 2014. The results show that firms with better reputation award their executives higher excess incentive compensation and lower fixed compensation. In ad-dition, the findings show that family control has a moderating effect on the relationship between reputation and excess incentive compensation. Specifically, the impact of rep-utation on excess incentive compensation is weaker for family firms.
