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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/33684


    题名: 企業聲譽與管理者超額薪酬關係:兼論家族控制持股之影響
    Reputation and Excess Executive Compensation:The Influence of Family Control
    作者: 林怡君
    贡献者: 會計學系
    关键词: 高階管理者薪酬
    固定薪酬
    激勵薪酬
    聲譽
    家族控制持股
    executive compensation
    fixed compensation
    incentive compensation
    reputation
    family control
    日期: 2016-06
    上传时间: 2016-08-17 12:48:10 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究在於探討企業聲譽與家族控制對高階管理者超額薪酬之影響,研究中將高管薪酬區分為固定與激勵兩部分,研究樣本為台灣證券交易所上市(櫃)非金融產業公司,實證期間從2011至2014年。
    實證結果顯示,企業聲譽較高之公司會發給高階管理者較多超額激勵薪酬與較少固定超額薪酬。另外,本研究發現,家族控制對企業聲譽與高階管理者超額激勵薪酬有負向干擾作用,亦即在家族控制企業內,企業聲譽對高階管理者超額激勵薪酬之影響較低。
    This study aims to examine the impact of company reputation and family control on excess executive compensation, as well as whether family control alters the relationship between reputation and excess executive compensation. To conduct this research, executive compensation is classified as fixed and incentive ones. Our sample is non-financial firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Taipei Exchange in the period from 2011 to 2014. The results show that firms with better reputation award their executives higher excess incentive compensation and lower fixed compensation. In ad-dition, the findings show that family control has a moderating effect on the relationship between reputation and excess incentive compensation. Specifically, the impact of rep-utation on excess incentive compensation is weaker for family firms.
    显示于类别:[會計學系暨研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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