台灣都市計畫工業區變更回饋制度，本質為利得課稅思維，也是政府介入產權之轉換與界定，各地方政府在工業區回饋條件均有不同，且依實證案例政府取回比例已高於土地所有權人，因此此政策效率不彰；故本研究擬由賽局理論觀點探討回饋內容。
本研究以談判賽局理論推導工業區變更土地所有權人在回饋機制上的競租公式，嘗試增加申請人利潤極大化；以斯坦伯克寡佔模型與古諾寡佔模型利潤之差額推導競租公式。
經實證得出回饋機制上的競租公式，在個案實證上驗證公式具有解釋能力，並了解工業區變更土地所有權人及政府在回饋內容中利潤項目之量化數據及相互零和競爭關係。
本研究具體成果包括分析工業區變更過程中土地所有權人與政府在面對不同回饋內容上雙方不同的決策思維，並建構出了回饋談判賽局模型，又推導出了土地所有權人競租公式及其最適金額方案，更提出了變更回饋機制之價值分配的決策模型。
This study found the industrial district of urban planning area that betterment charge is a profit taxation in Taiwan, which is also the government's intervention in the conversion and definition of property rights. The betterment charge of local governments in industrial rezones are different. According to empirical cases, the government’s take-back ratio is already higher than that of land ownership. Therefore, the efficiency of this policy is not obvious. So this study intends to explore the content of betterment charge from the perspective of game theory.
This study is based on the negotiation game theory; deduces the competitive lease formula of the betterment mechanism for changing the land owner in the industrial rezone. The change applicant strives for profit maximization; the profit difference between the Stackelberg's duopoly model and the Cournot duopoly competition model can be obtained the rent bidding.
Through empirical cases, this research demonstrates that the rent bidding in the betterment mechanism has also been validated. And understand the quantitative data and mutual zero-sum competition relationship between the change of land ownership in the industrial zone and the government's income items in the betterment charge.
The study analysis of the process of industrial rezone; get the different decision-making of the land owner and the government in the different betterment, and the establishment of a negotiation game model, found out the land owner's rent bidding.
