個人法益之位階概念，是否為牢不可破之法則，甚有疑義，本文先行設想，倘若位階概念確實存在，則應有所體現於現行刑法之上，亦即彰顯於立法體例之中，以及適用於緊急避難之適當性權衡內。然，本文透過此二種面向進行審思，推導得出位階概念於現行刑法之中，已然隱晦不彰，或許位階概念已無須如此堅持。
是以，本文對於法益之發展史進行爬梳，從中覺察法益學說之爭論，大抵呈現於兩個面向上，其一為法益係先於刑法而存在，抑或係由國家刑罰權所創設；其二為法益究係主觀世界中之想像概念，抑或係存於客觀世界中之具體實存物。
隨後，本文另自社會心理學之角度，進一步確立法益之性質，且亦依此知悉，利益乃係從人與人間之互動下所探求而得。據此，何種利益方屬刑法所應加以保護之重要生存與生活利益，而足以成為刑法之法益，當以應刑性作為判斷標準。
應刑性之內涵為危懼共感，而危懼共感之來源則源自於人性尊嚴之破壞，是以，本文最後則以人性尊嚴作為建構個人法益之核心，亦即僅有破壞人性尊嚴底線之利益，方得透過應刑性之評價而成為刑法之法益，據此，本文嘗試進一步以人性尊嚴於刑法上之體現，建構出人身法益與尊嚴法益，從而揚棄個人法益之位階概念。
It is questionable whether the concept of a hierarchy of individual legal interests is an unbreachable principle. This paper first postulates the definite existence of the hierarchy and deduces its due embodiment in the current criminal law; namely, the concept of the hierarchy should both manifest in the legislative style and apply to necessity. However, following the examination of both the legislative style and necessity, this paper finds the concept of the hierarchy obscure and therefore concludes that there should not be a need to hold on to the concept of such a hierarchy.
Accordingly, by tracing the history of legal interests, this paper infers that disputes over theories of legal interests mainly divide into two aspects—the first being a causality question of whether the concept of individual legal interests comes before the establishment of criminal law or if the establishment of criminal law generates the aforementioned concept; and the second being an essential question of whether legal interests are concepts imagined in the subjective world or if they exist de facto in the objective world.
Thereafter, through the viewpoint of social psychology, this paper vindicates the characteristics of legal interests as well as the inference that interests derive from the interactions between individuals. As regards which interests belong to the compass of vital survival and living interests that ought to be protected under criminal law, and then constitute the legal interests of criminal law, should be judged according to the criterion of “Strafwürdigkeit.”
“Strafwürdigkeit” carries the connotation of a collective feeling of fear. Such an unsettling collective feeling comes from the violation of human dignity. Hence, this paper finally sets human dignity as the core of the establishment of individual legal interests, i.e. only the violation of the fundamental interests of human dignity can become the legal interest of criminal law through the criterion of “Strafwürdigkeit.” In consequence, taking a step further, based on the embodiment of human dignity in criminal law, this paper proposes the concepts of personal legal interests and dignity legal interest for the replacement of the existing idea of a hierarchy of individual legal interests.
