| 摘要: | 本研究主要探討反貪污運動、政治連結與所有權結構對投資現金流量敏感度的影響。本文以 2008 年至 2020 年上海和深圳證券交易所上市公司為樣本進行實證分析。本文透過文獻整理推論出六個研究假說，分別為假說 1：政治連結會提高投資現金流量敏感度；假說 2-1：具有政治連結的國有企業，會降低投資現金流量敏感度；假說 2-2：具有政治連結的內資法人企業，會降低投資現金流量敏感度；假說 2-3：具有政治連結的外資法人企業，會降低投資現金流量敏感度；假說 2-4：具有政治連結的家族企業，會降低投資現金流量敏感度；假說 3：反貪污運動會調節政治連結與所有權結構對投資現金流量敏感度的影響。
本文實證發現，政治連結會提高投資現金流量敏感度，加入所有權後，國有企業、內資法人、家族企業皆會降低投資現金流量敏感度，外資法人則不受影響；當進一步加入反貪污運動進行探討後，發現反貪污運動後，內資法人及家族企業會受到政治連結的影響而降低投資現金流量敏感度，國有企業及外資法人則不受影響。本文研究結果在新興市場的公司治理與管理實務上做出貢獻，亦即當管理者因市場之不完美之政治關係連結的利益時，需考量政治連結所帶來的潛在成本與利益，並加以權衡。
This article mainly discusses the impact of anti-corruption campaigns, political connections, ownership structure on investment cash flow sensitivity, and empirical analysis using Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies in mainland China from 2008 to 2020. There are six Hypothesis,H1: Political connections will increase the investment cash flow sensitivity ; H2-1: State-owned enterprises with political connections will reduce the investment cash flow sensitivity ; H2-2 : Domestic enterprises with political connections will reduce the investment cash flow sensitivity ; Hypothesis H2-3: Foreign enterprises with political connections will reduce the investment cash flow sensitivity ; Hypothesis H2-4: Family enterprises with political connections will reduce investment cash flow sensitivity; Hypothesis H3: Anti-corruption campaigns moderate the effects of political connections and ownership structure on investment cash flow sensitivity.
This paper empirically finds that political connections will increase the investment cash flow sensitivity. After adding ownership structure , state-owned enterprises, domestic enterprises, and family enterprises will reduce investment cash flow sensitivity , while foreign enterprises will not be affected. After the anti-corruption campaign, domestic enterprises and family enterprises would be affected by political connections and reduce the investment cash flow sensitivity, while state-owned enterprises and foreign enterprises would not be affected. The findings of this paper contribute to corporate governance and management practices in emerging markets, when managers embed the benefits of political connections due to market imperfections, they need to consider the potential costs and benefits of political connections and apply them accordingly. |
