年度總預算為政府施政之基礎，審議中央政府總預算案或特別預算案，是立法委員監督中央政府政策的權力。根據《中央政府總預算案審查程序》：「總預算案係由各委員會分別審查，而各委員會審查總預算案時，得邀請有關機關首長列席報告、備詢及提供有關資料，並進行詢答、處理。」
「角色理論」認為立法委員於預算審查過程中會有一定模式的角色扮演與相對應的預期行為類型。依照特定立場（如政黨利益）或是利害關係（如選區利益），來做為政府預算刪減、凍結決議或主決議的考量。不同的委員對於預算審查中有不同的偏好，會經由個別的策略來影響預算審查結果來達到連任的最大目的。
本文以角色理論為基礎，選取一○九年度立法院交通委員會審查交通部主管預算案作為個案研究案例，檢證立法委員在交通部預算審查過程中之提案類型及內容，來分析立法委員有那些特定的角色扮演與預期的行為類型。研究結果發現，立法委員於預算分組審查時受到信仰理念、政黨色彩、選區派系、利益團體及各種外力之因素影響，有強烈的特定角色參與及預期行為在其中，檢證立法委員在交通部預算審查過程中之提案類型及內容來分析立法委員有那些特定的角色扮演與預期的行為類型。
Budgets lay the foundations for the government’s policy implementation. The process of reviewing and approving the Central Government General Budget is the Right of initiative for the Legislative Yuan to supervise the government’s policy implementation. In accordance with the procedure for reviewing the Central Government General Budget Proposal, each committee of the Legislative Yuan reviews the general budget proposal separately and independently. During the review of the general budget proposal at each committee of the Legislative Yuan, the head of each and every government agency should be invited to give a report or a statement, to provide related documents, and additionally, to answer interpellation.
The Role Theory holds that each participant plays a specific role and exhibits anticipatory behavior during the process of reviewing the general budget proposal. These participants take their particular policy preferences (partisan interest) or stakeholders (constituent interest) into account when making decisions to cut the general budget, to freeze the execution of the general budget or to cast their votes for a general budget resolution. In other words, individual legislators have different inclinations for making decisions when reviewing the general budget proposal. For the sake of continuing in office, legislators adopt individualized strategies in an attempt to alter the outcomes of a general budget resolution.
Through the lens of the Role Theory, this thesis analyzes the members of the Transportation Committee of the Legislative Yuan’s review of the 2020 budget proposal from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications as an example and argues that legislators, influenced by factors, such as personal cause, party affiliation, local factions within the constituency, interest groups, and other external causes, play specific roles and exhibit prominent anticipatory behavior during the process of reviewing budget bills. This thesis analyzes what legislators’ anticipatory behavior and roles are based on the types and content of the budget bills they introduce during the process of reviewing the 2020 budget proposal from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
