反貪污運動、政治連結與資訊不對稱對 公司資本結構影響之研究-來自 中國上市公司的實證

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Title:	反貪污運動、政治連結與資訊不對稱對公司資本結構影響之研究-來自中國上市公司的實證 The Impact of ANTI-Corruption Campaigns, Political Connections, and In-formation Asymmetry on Corporate Capital Structure: Evidence from China
Authors:	蔣心瑜
Contributors:	財務金融學系
Keywords:	反貪污運動政治連結資訊不對稱資本結構中國 Anti-Corruption Campaigns Political Connections Information Asymmetry Capital Structure China
Date:	2021
Issue Date:	2023-02-22 09:17:09 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文主要探討反貪污運動、政治連結與資訊不對稱對公司資本結構之影響，並以2008年至2019年中國上市公司為樣本，進行假說之檢定。本文研究發現，政治連結對負債融資的正向影響高於資訊不對稱對負債融資的影響；當反貪污運動執行，政治連結會降低負債融資，不論公司是處於資訊不對稱高或低。本文研究結果顯示，反貪污運動切斷公司與政府間之連結，降低公司負債融資的能力。本文在政治連結與反貪污運動相關文獻有貢獻，亦即當經理人透過與政府的鑲嵌槓桿外部資源時，其所帶來的成本與利益，是投資人做決策時需要深入考量的。 This paper examines the impact of Anti-corruption campaigns, political connections, and information asymmetry on corporate capital structure. Using a sample of infor-mation on China listed companies from 2008 to 2019, This paper finds that the positive impact of political connections on debt financing is higher than the impact of infor-mation asymmetry on debt financing; when ANTI-corruption campaigns are imple-mented, political connections will reduce debt financing, regardless of whether the company is at a high or low level of information asymmetry. The findings of this paper show that the ANTI-corruption campaign cuts off the relationship between the company and the government and reduces the company’s ability of debt financing. This paper contributes to the literature on political connections and ANTI-corruption campaigns, that is, when managers leverage external resources through inlays with the government, the costs and benefits brought by them must be thoroughly considered when investors make decisions.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Banking & Finance ] Thesis

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