| 題名: | Antidumping protection and welfare in a differentiated duopoly |
| 作者: | Chang, RY (Chang, Ray-Yun)
Hwang, H (Hwang, Hong)
Peng, CH (Peng, Cheng-Hau) |
| 貢獻者: | 經濟系 |
| 關鍵詞: | Antidumping policies
Dumping measures
Market protection
Welfare |
| 日期: | 2020-07 |
| 上傳時間: | 2020-10-30 15:26:01 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | This paper employs a two-country Cournot model to investigate the protection and welfare effects of an antidumping (AD) duty and a price-undertaking policy under different dumping measures (i.e., injury margin and dumping margin) in a differentiated duopoly. We show that the welfare levels of the host country and the world as a whole are lower under a price-undertaking policy than an AD-duty policy. However, the former is superior to the AD-duty policy in terms of protection. These results are robust even if the firms engage in Bertrand competition. |
| 關聯: | JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 卷冊: 71 期: 3 頁數: 421-446 |
| 顯示於類別: | [經濟學系暨經濟學系碩博士班] 期刊論文
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