在法政哲學史上，⼈⺠的守法義務與抵抗權之間的辯證是⼀個不斷被學者重訪的重要議題。儘管⽬前學界的多數意⾒是「守法義務是⼀種有條件的政治義務」，但這並不意味著「主流觀點」內部沒有模糊與爭議之處。如果我們先籠統地將這種「⼈⺠在某些條件下得以違法的⾃由空間（latitude）」定義為所謂的抵抗權，那麼，在什麼樣的條件之下⼈⺠得以正當地違反法律與政策？抵抗的內涵是什麼？除了阻礙交通、侵入公署佔領，是否包括了武⼒衝突的可能？⽽這樣的抵抗權究竟是什麼樣的權利（right）？是法律下的權利還是凌駕實定法律之上的道德權利？甚⾄，在⾯對獨裁與暴政的時候，⼈⺠的抵抗是否不僅僅是權利，更應當是義務（duty）?這些問題都使得抵抗權的概念更為複雜，也衍⽣了截然不同的實踐結果，以及不同的法律與道德評價。群眾運動的起因與形式不同，有的是訴諸Rawls所謂的「公開的、非暴⼒的、出於良⼼、⽬的在於改變政府的法律或政策」的公⺠不服從（civil disobedience），例如台灣的「太陽花運動」與香港的「雨傘運動」，有的則是不排除以破壞與暴⼒迫使政府改變法令的「勇武抗命」（uncivil disobedience），例如香港的「反修例運動」與法國「黃背⼼運動」，⽽有的更是直接訴求政權更迭的⾰命⾏動（revolution），例如「阿拉伯之春」。⾯對這些時代的新變局，我們有必要從道德哲學與法政哲學的⾓度重新省思「抵抗」此⼀概念，並進⼀步分析「抵抗權」的內涵與應⽤，⼀⽅⾯幫助我們對這些重⼤政治社會事件的理解，也幫助我們做出適切的評價與評估。
In the history of legal and political philosophy, the conflict between people’s obligation to obey the law and the right to resistance has been investigates and revisited. The mainstream view agrees that although people have the obligation to obey the law, but the obligation is a conditional one. Even so, there is still room for debate in this mainstream view. For example, under what conditions can people justly disobey the laws and policies of a legitimate government? What is the latitude of resistance? Could people resist with forces? Is resistance a right? What kind of right is the right to resistance? Does resistance become a duty when there is dictatorship? These questions complicate the concept of resistance and have different practical entailments, including legal and moral evaluations. People’s resistance comes in different forms; some of them are civil disobedience in the Rawlsian sense (nonviolent resistance), such as Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement or Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement; some are uncivil resistance that appeals to force and violence, such as France’s Yellow Vests Movement, Arab Spring and Hong Kong’s current movement. In order to understand contemporary mass movements, we need to revise the concept of resistance and its philosophical foundation.
