由於許多產業(如汽車產業以及電子產業)具有「上游廠商勾結 (upstream collusion)」 的特徵,在這此特徵下廠商如何進行技術授權，及如何競爭是此計劃主要分析議題。有鑑於相關文獻研究的缺乏,本計畫將以一個上下游廠商皆採 Cournot 數量競爭的連續寡佔模型(successive Cournot oligopoly model) 作為分析主軸，並且建立一個結合廠商勾結行為與技術授權的一般化模型。根據此模型，我們將探討當存在「廠商勾結」的特性時,上游廠商如何決定均衡要素數量、授權廠商如何決定均衡授權金與最適授權策略,以及下游廠商如何決定均衡數量等議題。再者,本計畫也將針對各種勾結模式設定及不同的技術授權方式，分析其對授權廠商選擇均衡權利金以及上游廠商選擇均衡要素數量的影響,並進一步分析比較各自對市場均衡的影響及差異。
Since upstream collusion is commonly existing in many industries, such as the automotive and the computer industry, the optimal licensing contracts and the competitions among these firms are thus of interest. However, only few papers dealt with these issues systematically in the literature. Therefore, this project aims at proposing a general framework with collusion and technology licensing in successive Cournot oligopoly model, and investigating how the collusion affect the optimal licensing contracts within this framework. More specifically, I am going to analyze how a licensor determines its optimal licensing contracts, fixed licensing fee and royalty rate while licensing its technology to the rival, and what the equilibrium quantities are. The differences among these market equilibria corresponding to various model settings, then, will be systematically discussed and analyzed in this project.
