| 摘要: | 本研究在於探討公司績效與競爭策略對管理者薪酬之影響，競爭策略採Porter(1980)分類架構，衡量採Yamakawa, Yang, and Lin(2011)之方法，管理者薪酬區分為激勵與現金薪酬兩類型。研究對象為2014至2018年台灣證券交易所非金融產業上市公司，實證結果發現，公司績效對管理者激勵與現金薪酬呈正向影響(即具有薪酬績效敏感度)，表示管理者激勵、現金薪酬與公司績效具有關聯性。另外，策略變數會影響激勵與現金薪酬績效敏感度，表示差異化策略公司之激勵與現金薪酬績效敏感度大於成本領導策略公司。
This study aims to examine the impact of company performance and competitive strategy on managerial compensation. To conduct this research, we use Porter’s (1980) framework of competitive strategy and Yamakawa, Yang, and Lin’s (2011) method of measurement. In view of compensation differentiation, we divide manageri-al compensation into incentive and cash compensation. Using non-financial firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018, we find that firm performance is positively associated with both incentive and cash compensation. Such results imply that managerial compensation is somewhat reasonable. In addition, the variable Com-petitive Strategy has a negative and significant impact on either incentive or cash pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), indicating that differentiation-strategy companies have a higher PPS than do cost-leadership-strategy companies. |
