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    題名: 改善公司治理:現金流量權與兩權偏離的角色
    Improving Corporate Governance: the Role of Cash Flow Right and Excess Control Right
    作者: 呂學典
    貢獻者: 會計學系
    關鍵詞: 公司治理
    現金流量權
    兩權偏離
    Corporate governance
    Cash flow right
    Excess control right
    日期: 2019-2020
    上傳時間: 2019-11-04 13:35:39 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本計畫目標在於驗證是否企業公司治理改善程度受到最終控制者現金流量權與兩權偏離程度(投票權減去現金流量權)的顯著影響。本計畫對於現金流量權與公司治理改善程度間關係,提出利益收斂假說與替代治理假說;對於兩權偏離與公司治理改善程度間關係,提出利益掠奪假說與信號假說。預計以公布所有台灣上市(櫃)公司評等資料的頭兩年(即2016年與2017年)資料為基礎。對於現金流量權,本計畫預期發現公司治理評等的提升與現金流量權呈負相關,獲得支持替代治理假說的證據。此結果隱含當控制股東與小股東的利益越趨一致,企業越不會增加公司治理機制。對於兩權偏離,本計畫預期發現公司治理評等的提升與兩權偏離程度呈正相關,此證據支持信號假說。即當控制權與所有權偏離越嚴重,最終控制者越有可能透過公司治理評等提升,向市場發送利益掠奪風險已被降低的訊息。
    The purpose of this study is to examine whether a firm’s corporate governance improvement is determined by the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash flow right and excess control right. I propose two hypotheses for the cash flow right (the convergence-of-interest hypothesis vs. the substitute governance hypothesis) and two hypotheses for the excess control right (the entrenchment hypothesis vs. the signaling hypothesis) that may explain the improvement of a firm’s corporate governance rating. To conduct this study, I utilize the first two years data of corporate governance rating results for all Taiwanese listed firms in 2016 and 2017. I expect to observe that the empirical results show evidence in favor of the substitute governance hypothesis, i.e., a negative relation between the cash flow right and corporate governance improvement. The firms may not implement redundant governance mechanisms if the largest shareholder’s interests are aligned with those of minority shareholders. Furthermore, I posit that the evidence supports the signaling hypothesis, which indicates a positive relationship between the excess control right and corporate governance improvement. This result implies that a rating-altering change in corporate governance can be a signal of lower exposure to expropriation risks caused by control-ownership divergence.
    顯示於類別:[Department of Accounting & Graduate Institute of Accounting] project

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