農村的集體土地產權，一直是中國大陸中央和地方政府之間，最大的利益衝突所在。中央的原則規定，到了鄉鎮一級政府執行時，經常出現變通，甚至背離中央原政策的精神，造成地方政府的贏家地位。中央政策模糊，或政策之間相互衝突不協調，是地方政府賴以取得自主權的主要原因。基層鄉鎮政府執行土地流轉政策時，如何提出偏向性的解釋以及選擇性執行？政策如何模糊？為何模糊？地方政府如何達到利益最大化的目的？ 本計畫以重慶市和成都市為例，借用Richard Matland有關政策執行研究中，所提出的「模糊-衝突」模型，用以解釋中國大陸地方政府在面對中央的模糊和不協調的土地流轉政策時，所展現的應對行為。本計畫進一步結合大陸地方政治生態中的強大利益環境，作為中介變項，提出「模糊-衝突－利益」的三維度視角，分析中國大陸地方基層鄉鎮政權的自主行為。本計畫認為，土地流轉政策的模糊性高，衝突性亦高，行動者對核心價值、問題關鍵、以及問題的解決辦法，並無共識，使得地方政府對政策執行陽奉陰違，政策制定者和政策執行者之間，因而出現議價空間。 Ownership of the farm land has been the most contentious issue between China’s central government and local governments. The decisions from the top, often vague to accommodate regional differences, are often misconstrued and implemented in ways beyond recognition. And local governments are always the winners. Vagueness and inconsistencies of policies have given local governments room for maneuvering. How do the local governments distort and get around the policy of land transfer currently underway in China? This is a vital issue deserving our attention. How do they do it? How vague is the policy? Is there confrontation between the central government and local governments? How do the local governments maximize their gains? Using Chongqing and Chengdu as examples and borrowing the theory of “ambiguity and confrontation” in policy implementation developed by Richard Matland, this project intends to find out the ways local Chinese governments resort to in the face of ambiguous and inconsistent policies enacted by the center. In the process, interests of local governments, especially various departments of the local governments concerning the land, are analyzed. The project will show that local governments have become more autonomous and dexterous because of the policy ambiguity and discrepancies. The pragmatism provides room for bargaining.
