本研究旨在檢測管理者權力與管理者酬金對企業現金有效稅率之影響，研究中採用2013至2017年台灣上市公司為樣本。實證結果發現，管理者權力與長期現金有效稅率呈正向關係，顯示權力較大之管理者比較不會採取積極避稅措施。另管理者酬金與管理者權力交乘項對長期現金有效稅率有負向影響，顯示當管理者處於高權力時，管理者酬金的增加，會提高管理者租稅規避誘因。
This study examines the impact of manager power and manager compensation on corporate cash effective tax rate. Using a sample of listing firms on the Taiwan Stok Ex-change from 2013 to 2017, the results show that manager power is positively and significantly associated with long-term cash effective tax rate, indicating that managers of more power are less willing to engage in aggressive tax-avoidance activities. In addition, the intersection variable of manager power and manager compensation is negatively and significantly related to long-term cash effective tax rate, showing that in cases where managers are of more power, an increase in manager pay can induce managers to engage in tax-avoidance activities.
