本研究在於檢測競爭策略與控制權偏離對管理者與員工薪酬關係之影響。研究樣本為2012-2017 年台灣證券交易所上市公司，競爭策略區分為成本領導、差異化、成本領導且差異化以及無明顯策略等4 種，控制權偏離以控制股東控制權與盈餘分配權之差異為衡量。實證結果顯示，競爭策略會影響管理者與員工薪酬比率；成本領導策略公司之管理者與員工薪酬比率最大，而差異化策略公司最小，此結果表示採成本領導策略公司，會傾向壓低非管理階層之人力成本，而採差異化策略公司，其管理階層較願意與員工分享經濟利益。另本研究也發現，控制權偏離會影響管理者與員工薪酬比率；控制權愈偏離之公司，其管理者與員工薪酬比率愈小，表示控制權愈偏離之公司，愈願意將公司利益與員工分享。
This study examines the impact of competitive strategies and control right divergence on managerial pay to employee pay (MPEP). The sample used in this paper is firms trading on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in the period from 2012 to 2017. Competitive strategies are classified into four types: cost leadership, differentiation, cost leadership and differentiation, and no obvious strategy. Control right divergence is measured by the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder.The findings show that competitive strategies affect MPEP. Companies adopting cost leadership strategy have the highest MPEP and firms with differentiation strategy have
the smallest one. Such results indicate that companies with cost leadership strategy tend to reduce the labor cost of non-management, while firms with differentiation strategy are more willing to share their profits to employees by raising the level of pay. In addition, the results demonstrate that control right divergence affects MPEP, indicating that firms having larger control right divergence experience lower MPEP. Such results imply that firms with larger control right divergence are more willing to share profits with their employees.
