文化大學機構典藏 CCUR:Item 987654321/44216
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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/44216


    Title: 高階管理團隊與員工超額酬勞關聯性:股份盈餘偏離與員工生產力之調節效果
    Top Management Team Excess Compensation and Employee Excess Pay: The Moderating Effects of Divergence between Voting Rights and Cash-flow Rights and Employee Productivity.
    Authors: 林慧茹 (LIN, HUI-JU)
    Contributors: 會計學系
    Keywords: 高階管理團隊
    員工酬勞
    超額酬勞
    投票權
    盈餘分配權
    生產力
    top management team
    employee pay
    excess compensation
    voting rights
    cash-flow rights
    productivity
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2019-05-17 13:50:18 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究在於探討高階管理團隊超額酬勞對員工超額酬勞之影響,以及控制權與盈餘分配權偏離、員工生產力對高階管理團隊與員工超額酬勞關係之影響。實證結果指出,高階管理團隊超額酬勞、股份盈餘偏離與員工生產力會正向影響員工酬勞水準,亦即當高階管理團隊獲得較優渥酬勞、公司控制權與盈餘分配權偏離較大、以及員工生產力較高時,員工會獲得較高酬勞水準。另本研究發現,高階管理團隊超額酬勞與股份盈餘偏離具有交互作用,顯示控制權與盈餘分配權較大之公司,高階管理團隊與員工酬勞之連動性較高,此結果同於管理鞏固效果論點,即管理者在擁有股權較少情況下,為了鞏固權力,會傾向以酬勞作為權力鞏固之手段。高階管理團隊超額酬勞與員工生產力具有交互作用,顯示員工生產力較高的企業,高階管理團隊與員工酬勞之連動性亦較高;此結果可能隱含,員工生產力較高之企業,公司酬勞的分配較具公平性。
    This study examines the impact of top management team (TMT) excess compensation on employee excess pay as well as whether divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights and employee productivity affect the above relationship. Our findings indicate that TMT excess compensation, divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights, and employee excess productivity all have significantly positive effects on employee pay. Specifically, employees are better paid in cases where top managers receive higher rewards, employees are more productive and firms having larger divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights. In addition, the interaction variable of TMT excess compensation with divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights is positively related to employee excess pay, indicating that a closer link occurs between TMT compensation and employee pay in cases where firms experience larger divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights. Such a result is in line with the managerial entrenchment argument that managers may tend to use compensation as a tool to secure their power in their work place when they only hold little equity. The interaction variable of TMT excess compensation with employee productivity is positively associated with employee excess pay, showing the link is closer between TMT compensation and employee pay. Such a result may imply that pay fairness is better in firms having higher productivity.
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting & Graduate Institute of Accounting] Thesis

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