本文旨在探討政治連結與資訊不對稱對投資效率的影響。樣本由 2008 年到 2015 年的中國上市公司組成。實證結果顯示具有政治連結的公司將降低投資效率。本文認為，政治連結雖然為管 理者提供更多的資源但卻為了達到政府的政策及社會目標而使企業投資效率下降，特別是當資訊不對稱被考慮在內時，投資效率下降的程度更為明顯。且本文發現具有政治連結的公司會增加資 訊的不對稱性，使企業的投資效率下降。本文實證結果在管理意涵上為，在這個獨特的中國資本市場中，政治連結可能為企業帶來成本，亦即政治連結會提高資訊不對稱，進而損害企業的投資 價值。本文的實證結果對新興市場亦有意涵，亦即在法律規範薄弱，公司治理不彰的新興市場，政治關係所帶給企業的利弊是管理當局與投資人須加以權衡的。
This paper aims the effect of political connections on the efficiency of investment with consideration of information asymmetry. The sample consists of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2015. The empirical results show that companies with political connections will reduce investment efficiency. While political connection provide more resources for managers, they also reduce the efficiency of corporate investment in order to meet government policies and social goals. In particular, when information asymmetry is taken into account, the degree of decline in investment efficiency is even greater obvious. Further, the results found that companies with political connections increase the asymmetry of information and reduce the investment efficiency of enterprises. The results indicate that in this unique Chinese capital market, political connections may bring about disadvantages for the company. However, the links between political connection and information asymmetries will further impair the value of corporate investment. Our results also imply that in emerging market, manager and inverstors have to trade-off the befefit and cost from political connections.
