| 摘要: | 本研究探討公司理財範疇之兩大策略投資課題，即購併與合資。兩篇論文各包含兩大主軸，第一部分為探討美國一般產業之績效欠佳經理人的行為，研究其與購併或合資事件發生頻率之關係，第二部分藉由上述之發現，探討績效欠佳經理人於購併或合資宣告期間內，對購併公司或合資夥伴股東財富效果之影響。 過去文獻發現，於購併完成後經理人薪酬會增加，且此增加的部分足以抵銷因購併所帶來股價下跌的損失。過去文獻亦發現，公司能夠經由合資，取得相對於產業內競爭對手較高的競爭優勢，此競爭優勢來自於經營上的規模經濟與取得另一合資夥伴的新技術，以致多數合資於宣告期間都有股價上漲的效果。另外，亦有文獻表示績效欠佳之經理人容易選擇高度風險的投資計劃。基於上述論點，本研究預期績效欠佳經理人會選擇超額風險的投資計劃來改善其績效，因此他們會較容易承作購併或多角化購併，以及合資或國際合資，此效果預期對於績效欠佳經理人且其股權激勵誘因高者更強。 對於購併公司與合資夥伴股東財富效果方面，過去文獻指出多角化會更傷害股東財富，然而國際合資擁有進入新的資本市場且能避免資訊不對稱、債權融資時的稅盾與經營上的規模經濟等優點。基於上述假說，績效欠佳經理人會更容易承作多角化購併與國際合資事件成立下，本文預期對於績效欠佳經理人所承做之購併事件，會有更負向的股東財富效果，然而對於績效欠佳經理人所承做之合資事件，會有更正(負)向的股東財富效果，且此財富效果對於績效欠佳經理人其股權激勵誘因高者亦更強。 本研究之預期結果，對於探討績效欠佳經理人的風險忍受能力，及其行為對於公司投資決策方面提供學術研究之貢獻，另外，亦對於造成購併公司於購併宣告期間之負向財富效果，及對於造成合資夥伴於合資宣告期間之正(負)向財富效果，提供一個新的影響因子。
This study explore two kinds of corporate strategic investments in the field of corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and joint ventures (JVs). Two essays contain two main parts, respectively. The first is to investigate the behavior of underperforming chief executive officers (CEOs) to examine the incidence of mergers and joint ventures in the U.S. industrial firms, respectively. Based on above findings, I then explore the influence of CEO underperformance on acquirers’ and partners’ shareholder wealth effect during the announcement period of mergers and joint ventures, respectively. For literature shows that CEO compensation increases following mergers and this increase part can offset the losses of stock price reaction during mergers. Literature also suggest that partner firms receive a high competitive advantage compared to other intra-industry firms from joint ventures through scale economics on operations and accessing new skills from the other partner. Most of joint ventures show that the stock reactions for partner firms increase during the announcement period. Moreover, prior studies indicate that underperforming CEOs tend to take higher risk investment projects. Based on above description, I expect that underperforming CEOs tend to adopt investment projects with excessive risk for improving their performance. Underperforming CEOs are expected to be more likely to make acquisitions or diversifying mergers and joint ventures or international joint ventures, respectively, especially for the group of CEOs with high equity incentives. For acquirer and partner shareholder wealth effect, literature suggests that diversification destroys stockholders’ wealth more deeply, while international joint ventures take the advantage of entering new capital markets and also preventing from information asymmetries, the tax shield of debt financing, and scale economics on operations. Based on my hypothesis that underperforming CEOs are expected to be more likely to make diversifying mergers and international joint ventures, I expect that the stockholder wealth effect will be more negative to merger bids for underperforming CEOs, and more positive (negative) to joint ventures for them, respectively. Moreover, these wealth effects are expected to be stronger for underperforming CEOs with high equity incentives. The expected results in this study provide contributions to the literature for investigating risk tolerance of underperforming CEOs and their behavior in the firm’s investment policies. They also contribute to provide a new determinant to explain the negative acquirer wealth effect during announcement period of mergers and the positive (negative) partner wealth effect during announcement period of joint ventures, respectively. |
