文化大學機構典藏 CCUR:Item 987654321/40429
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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/40429


    Title: 政治連結、資訊不對稱和所有權結構 對風險承擔的影響-以中國上市公司 為例
    The Effect of Politically Connected, Information Asymmetry and Ownership Structure on Risk Taking-Evidence from China
    Authors: 劉家妤
    Contributors: 財務金融學系
    Keywords: 政治連結
    風險承擔
    所有權結構
    資訊不對稱
    中國
    political connection
    risk taking
    ownership structure
    information asymmetry
    China
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-07-31 14:55:02 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文主要探討政治連結、資訊不對稱和所有權結構對風險承擔的影響，並以中國上市公司為樣本，樣本期間從2008年到2015年。本文提出政治贊助對公司風險承擔的影響取決於資訊不對稱和所有權結構的程度。結果顯示，有政治連結的公司風險承擔較沒有政治連結的公司風險承擔較低。然而，當資訊不對稱和所有權結構的影響被考慮時，管理者和投資者之間的代理問題似乎因為政治連結和國有企業的資訊不對稱加劇而惡化，進而提高了公司的風險承擔。本文研究結果隱含，在中國特殊發展的資本市場下，政治連結對公司的利弊需視其帶來的資訊不對稱與所有權結構而定。
    This paper examines the linkage between politically connected, information asymmetry, ownership structure and risk taking in China. The sample is comprised of information on Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2015. This paper refers that the effect of political patronage on corporate risk taking will depend on the level of in-formation asymmetry and ownership structure. The results show that firms with polit-ical connections show a lower risk taking relative to firms without political connec-tions. However, when the impact of information asymmetry, ownership structure are taken into consideration, agency problems between mangers and investors appear to be worsened by political connectedness and higher information asymmetry in SOE, which in turn raise the firm’s risk taking. Taken together, these findings suggest that although the problem of an imperfect capital market can be mitigated by political connected-ness, the risk taking for firms with political connections accompanied by higher in-formation asymmetry in SOE.
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Banking & Finance ] Thesis

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