資訊不對稱的食品供應鏈、食品安全與追溯

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Title:	資訊不對稱的食品供應鏈、食品安全與追溯 Food supply chain, food safety and traceability under information asymmetry
Authors:	塗立委
Contributors:	經濟學系
Keywords:	食品追溯 Food traceability
Date:	2018
Issue Date:	2018-05-03 10:58:20 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文主要探討台灣目前的食品業供應鏈和政府推動食品履歷的環境下，食品業供應鏈上游業者在製造過程中保持食材安全的努力水準，由下游食品加工廠的問題產品去追蹤上游原料供應商，進而探討食品安全的管理與後續問題追蹤。食安事件爆發時，多顯示過往食安問題的發生，其使用商的確不做查驗，故用經濟理論模型來檢視，本研究在一家供應商與追溯機制下分別探討上、下游業者對於食材資訊處於對稱和不對稱的情況下，下游業者如何設計合約內容來導引上游業者努力控管食材供應流程的衛生和安全，接著擴充上游業者家數至兩家，上、下游業者採取策略達到目標。設立委託-代理模型(principal-agent model)的互動關係搭配三階段賽局架構(three-stage game framework)，第一階段為委託人(下游食品加工廠)做決策，第二階段為代理人(上游供應商)做決策，第三階段為委託人做決策，競爭求解使用「倒推法」(backward induction)解得上游供應商與下游食品加工廠之間的三階段賽局在不對稱資訊情況下的次佳解以及對稱資訊情況下的最佳解，並比較它們的異同。研究結果發現下游食品加工廠真的不會去追溯查驗進來的原生食材，上游食材供應商必定加入政府設立的食品履歷制度。 The article mainly discusses Taiwan's current food supply chain and the traceabilty. The upstream(agent) maintain the preferred level of food safety effort, and through the defective material from the downstream(principal) to find the source of a problem. The research set up a principal-agent model with a three-stage game framework, the principal make decisions in the first stage and the agent make decisions in the second stage, the principal make decisions in third stage. Using "backward induction" get the solution. The study found that the downstream really not test the ingredients. And upstream food suppliers must join the food record system.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Economics & Graduate Institute of Economics ] thesis

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