董事、高階經理人超額酬勞與員工酬勞關聯性之研究

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/38160

Title:	董事、高階經理人超額酬勞與員工酬勞關聯性之研究 The Relationships of Directors and Chief Executive Officers’ Excess Compensations with Employee Pay
Authors:	王妤如
Contributors:	會計學系
Keywords:	董事高階經理人員工管家理論公平理論超額酬勞 directors chief executive officer employee stewardship theory equity theory excess compensation
Date:	2017
Issue Date:	2017-09-20 12:46:51 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究主要在於探討董事、CEO超額酬勞與員工酬勞之關係，以及經營型態對此關係之影響。研究中以台灣證券交易所2013至2015年上市公司為樣本，實證結果指出，董事、CEO超額酬勞與員工酬勞呈正向關係，顯示董事與CEO超額酬勞較多之公司，其員工有較高之酬勞水平，支持公平理論觀點。而董事超額酬勞與董事長兼總經理交叉項對員工酬勞呈正向影響，顯示董事長兼任總經理之公司，其董事領取超額酬勞對員工酬勞增加之影響效果較大，隱含管家經營型態之公司，其董事與一般員工之酬勞具有較密切關聯性。 This study aims to examine the relationships of directors and chief executive offic-ers’ excess compensations with employee pay as well as whether governance style af-fects such relationships. To conduct this research, firms trading in the Taiwan and Taipei Stock Exchanges in the period from 2013 to 2015 are used as the sample. The results show that directors and CEOs’ excess compensations are positively associated with em-ployee pay, respectively. Such findings, in line with equity theory, indicate that firms awarding directors or CEOs higher excess compensation offer their employees a higher level of pay. In addition, the interaction variable of directors’ excess compensation and CEO duality is positively related to employee pay, showing that directors’ excess com-pensation has a stronger effect on employees’ pay level in case where board chairs also serve as CEOs. Such a finding implies that there exists a closer link between directors and employees’ rewards where companies operate in the style of stewardship.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Accounting & Graduate Institute of Accounting] Thesis

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