台灣自2004年實施保險業風險基礎資本額制度，但缺乏弱體保險公司進行立即糾正措施，形成所謂的「金融監理寬容」現象。本研究內容係檢驗國內弱體壽險公司是否利用安定基金制度及在金融監理寬容期間，增加資產風險來提高隱含選擇權價值傾向。本研究發展弱體公司在風險性質產投資具有非常顯著正相關，符合道德風險、風險補貼與反射效應假學說，其次發現高風險商品會增加資產風險，以及主管機關接管、金嵥海嘯衝擊與外商公司為大股東者，會使公司風險性質產投資比率降低，證實無法規監管成本、商品風險、金融集團大股東之監控能力與外在經濟因素確實會顯著影響公司的投資決策。
The Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C. adopted insurer risk-based capital (RBC) formula that became effective in January 2004. However, the regulatory forbearance is derived since regulators haven’t taken any prompt corrective action to deal with weak insurers even if their capitals fell below specified levels. In this paper we emphasize the opportunistic behaviors of weak insurers under regulatory forbearance. We investigate that weak insurers would have greater risk-taking incentives due to guarantee fund with fixed rate. Our evidences show that a very strong support for weak (and high leveraged) insurers exists with high tendency in asset risk. It is consistent with moral hazard, risk-subsidy and reflection effect theories. We also find that regulatory pressure, product risk, the monitoring power of financial group and external economic factors affect the investment decision of weak insurers very well.
