文化大學機構典藏 CCUR:Item 987654321/35387
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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/35387


    题名: Does the identity of multiple large shareholders affect the value of excess cash? Evidence from China
    作者: Lin, TJ (Lin, Tsui-Jung)
    Tsai, HF (Tsai, Han-Fang)
    Imamah, N (Imamah, Nur)
    Hung, JH (Hung, Jung-Hua)
    贡献者: 財金系
    关键词: Multiple large shareholders
    Ownership structure
    Value of excess cash
    Split share structure reform
    日期: 2016-12
    上传时间: 2017-02-10 14:49:07 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on the value of corporate excess cash holdings with consideration of the existence of multiple large shareholders (MIS) and the impact of the split share structure reform. The sample is comprised of information on Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2011. The empirical results indicate that the presence of MIS increases the value of excess cash holdings, however, this effect exists only in OwnG group, where government is the controlling shareholder and the main MIS (the second largest shareholder) is a non-government entity (local institutional investor or foreign institutional investor). When the impact of the split share structure reform is taken into consideration, this reform enhances the monitoring of MLS in OwnG group and increases the value of excess cash holdings, especially when the contestability of control between the controlling shareholder and MIS becomes stronger. Our results imply that in this unique capital market of China, MIS play a valuable monitoring role in firms with more severe agency problems and when the contestability of control is stronger, especially after the split structure reform. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
    關聯: PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL 卷: 40 頁碼: 173-190 子輯: A
    显示于类别:[Department of Banking & Finance ] periodical articles

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