既有之授權文獻大多假設授權廠商只能進行產業外授權或產業內授權。為了整合前述兩個極端的例子，本文建立一多市場模型，探討授權廠商之最適授權契約。此一模型之特色為被授權廠商可同時生產兩種產品一種產品與授權廠商之產品完全同質，另一種產品則與授權廠商的產品存在水平差異性。本文假設授權廠商透過兩部訂價法的授權契約將其先進技術授權給被授權廠商使用。我們發現在授權之技術為非劇烈創新且創新程度較小（大）時，最適授權契約為純粹的單位權利金契約（兩部訂價契約）；但當授權之技術為劇烈創新時，授權廠商也一定會將其先進技術授權給其競爭對手，且其最適兩部訂價授權契約中之單位權利金與固定權利金均為正。此一結果與單一市場下之結論迥異。
Most studies which address licensing treat a licensor firm as either an insider or outsider. To integrate the two extreme cases, this paper sets up a model in which the licensee firm can produce two goods, one is homogeneous to and the other is horizontally differentiated from that produced by the licensor firm. The licensor firm licenses its superior technology to a licensee firm via a two-part tariff contract. It is found that if the innovation is non-drastic, the optimal licensing contract is composed of a pure royalty (two-part tariffs) if the innovation is small (large). On the other hand, with a drastic innovation, the licensor firm, contraposition to that in a single market case, definitely licenses its technology to its rival. Moreover, the royalty rate and the fixed fee in the optimal two-part tariff contract should both be positive.
