貿易衝突模型主張本國不會與貿易伙伴目標國引發增加衝突，乃因為懼怕會失去兩國之冒的貿易利得。本文延伸貿易衝突模型，檢視一個國家與第三國的貿易與衝突的改變如何影響國際關係。理論上可以證明兩點：（1）如果第三國與目標國是朋友關係，則本國增加與第三國之貿易，會減少與目標國之衝突（2）如果第三國與目標國是敵對關係，則本國舍加與第三國之貿易，會增加與目標國之衝突。使用衝突與和平資料庫三十國樣本，並將它分為三個第三國區塊：西方區塊、中東區塊及東方區塊。實證分析提供證據支持理論假設。相似的推理，如果本國與第三國區塊衝突改變之影響也被討論檢定。除此之外，實證結果顯示西方區塊國家在世異政治與經濟關係扮演重要角色。
The trade-conflict model claims that one state, designated "actor", is deterred from initiating conflict against a trading partner, designated "target", for fear of losing the welfare gains associated with trade. This paper extends the trade-conflict model to garner implications concerning trade and conflict interactions where third party blocs are involved. The theoretical propositions supported by proofs are: (1)Increasing trade by an "actor" with a third party will decrease conflict with a "target", if the third party and target are "friends", who already have a negative level of mutual conflict. (2)Increasing trade with a third party will increase conflict with a target, if thee third party and target are "rivals', having a positive level of mutual conflict. A 30-country sample from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) is used and divided into three blocs: a western bloc, a middle eastern bloc, and an eastern bloc as the three blocs: a western bloc, a middle eastern bloc, and an eastern bloc as the three parties. Empirical analysis provides support for the hypotheses derived from the model. A similar relationship is also discussed and tested for situations in which conflict increase or decreases between the actor and third party bloc. In addition, the empirical tests show that the western bloc countries play a central role in world politics and economic relations.
