本文研究當經濟體系面臨總體衝擊時，金融中介分攤系統性風險的功能。依據本文的疊代模型，金融中介在累積利潤的同時，也建立了爲經濟個體提供總體衝擊緩衝機制的能力；中介的利潤空間、獨占力量及契約內容共同影響總體風險分攤的運作。而金融中介與直接金融交易二者的風險分攤功能彼此互補,並非相互競爭。此外，政府應適當規範金融中介的市場結構，避免金融中介擁有過大或不足的獨占力量，進而引導中介提供福利水準較高的金融契約。
This paper provides an overlapping generations model to investigate the role of decentralized intermediaries in buffering aggregate shocks. Such buffering mechanisms are implemented through cross-generational risk sharing and profit accumulation. Market power, potential profits, and contractual arrangements are vital to profit-driven financial intermediaries to provide participants insurance against aggregate shocks. In market equilibrium, aggregate shocks cause the value of the agent’s wealth to fluctuate. Our intermediated contracts alleviate this adverse effect and are complementary to financial market transactions. Although there exists efficiency gains from our decentralized intermediation, the gains are not as great as what Allen and Gale (1997)'s centralized bank achieves. In view of financial regulatory policy, adequate market power is required to induce intermediaries to provide the Pareto superior financial contracts.
