為鼓勵民眾參與政治，日本於1948年通過《政治資金規正法》（Political Funds Control Act）明訂政治與金錢的關係。鑒於日益嚴重的金權政治，該法歷經數次修法，卻出現政治資金逐年暴增的窘狀。為此，本文分析制度與行為者的互動關係，以及依據政治資金收支報告書的實證數據，說明制度變動後的成效。本文發現該法越是嚴格規範，越是出現政治資金總額不降反升的現象，以及獻金規則變更後，企業和團體獻金途徑的改變。
In order to encourage citizens to participate in politics, Japan adopted the ”Political Funds Control Act” in 1948 to regulate political finance. Due to prevailing pork-barrel politics, the ”Political Funds Control Act” has been modified several times. However, it still fails to ameliorate the situation of growing political funds. As a result, this study attempts to examine the interactive relationship between institutions and actors. And provide empirical evidence for the effect of institutional change on regulation of political finance using data from the political fund financial report. This study finds that the more restrictive regulation of political funds contributes to increase, rather than decrease, of political finance. Furthermore, the modification of the ”Political Funds Control Act” also changes the way that enterprises and organizations use for political donations.
