| 摘要: | 投資人關注公司盈餘達到或超越證券分析師盈餘預測，業屬根深蒂固之企業文化。過去研究指出公司對此種企業文化，由消極態度趨向積極地誘使證券分析師改變原先預期(稱之為預期管理)，以達到或超越證券分析師預測，蓋達到或超越證券分析師預測，能使公司股價極大化，並取得股東及債權人之信賴，亦能減少訴訟成本。Liu, Tiras, and Zhuang (2014)探討審計委員會專業性對預期管理之影響，發現審計委員會具備會計專業，能抑制管理當局從事預期管理；惟甚少文獻探討資本結構對預期管理之影響，故本研究探討審計委員會專業性、資本結構對預期管理之影響，並觀察從事預期管理之公司，是否會另為盈餘管理，以補足過去文獻闕漏。實證結果指出，當審計委員會具備財會專業、債權人權力愈大，及機構投資人持股比率愈高時，能抑制預期管理，代表審計委員會、債權人，及機構投資人持股，屬於有效監督機制；惟當公司屬於家族企業時，將促使管理當局從事預期管理，代表家族企業之公司治理制度較不健全。
Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts of earnings is concerned with investors as well as entrenched in today’s corporate culture. In previous studies, corporations are active players who try to alter analysts’ earnings report (referred to as expectations management), rather than passive observers in the game of meeting or beating con-temporaneous analysts’ expectations. The behavior can maximize the share price, boost management’s credibility for shareholders and creditors, and decrease litigation costs. Liu, Tiras, and Zhuang (2014)find the accounting expert on the audit commit-tee constrains expectations management. However, few studies discuss about expec-tations management on the capital structure perspective. Consequently, this study aims to investigate the impact of expectations management on audit committee ex-pertise, capital structure, and corporations who walk down analysts’ earnings expec-tations by issuing earnings guidance or press releases whether use earnings manage-ment.This study finds evidences that managers are less likely to engage in expecta-tions management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts of earnings when there is a fi-nancial expert serving on the audit committee, enhancement of creditor power, and raising institutional ownership. The result implies that audit committee, creditor power, and institutional ownership are an effective monitoring mechanism. In con-trast, managers are impelled to engage in expectations management by family cor-porations. The result suggests that family corporations of construction of corporate governance are imperfect. |
