| Abstract: | 本研究在於檢測薪酬委員會獨立性、專業性與工作涉入對高階管理者異常酬勞之影響。研究中採用台灣證券交易所上市公司為樣本，以獨立董事佔薪酬委員會席次衡量獨立性，委員具大專教師或專技資格比例衡量專業性，出席率與開會次數作為工作涉入代理變數。實證結果顯示，薪酬委員會專業性與獨立性不影響高管異常酬勞，然薪酬委員會專業性與獨立性交叉項對高管固定與激勵異常酬勞均具有負向影響，表示高專業薪酬委員會下，委員會獨立性對高管異常薪酬有較明顯降低效果。基此，本研究建議同時強化專業性與獨立性會有助於促進高管酬勞之公平性。另外，薪酬委員會開會次數與管理者固定異常酬勞呈正向關係，顯示開會次數愈多，固定異常酬勞愈高；此結果可能隱含，經過多次協商所成就之薪酬結果通常會逸離合理值。
This study is to examine the effects of independence, profession, and work involvement of compensation committees on abnormal executive compensation. To conduct this research, non-financial firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange are used as a sample, and independence is measured by the ratio of the number of independent directors relative to the total committee members, profession by the ratio of the number of members concurrently having professorship or professional credentials relative to the total committee members, work involvement by the attendance frequency and the number of meetings held by compensation committees. The results show that independence as well as profession do not individually affect abnormal executive compensation. However, the interaction variable of independence and profession is significantly associated with abnormal executive compensation, indicating that there exists the interactive effect of independence and profession on abnormal executive compensation. This study thus suggests that, in order to improve the rationality of executive compensation, independence and profession of compensation committees should be risen at the same time. In addition, the study demonstrates that the number of meetings is positively related to abnormal fixed executive compensation, showing that companies with more meetings have higher abnormal fixed executive compensation. Such a result implies that an overly high number of meetings may be caused by irrational executive reward policy. |
