本研究目的在於探討公司績效與資訊透明度對高階經理人超額薪酬之影響，研究對象為台灣非金融上市櫃公司，研究期間為2012至2014年。實證結果指出，績效(會計績效與市場績效)越差之公司，會傾向採用超額激勵與固定薪酬激勵管理者，此現象合乎人力資本理論觀點。而資訊透明度會正向干擾公司績效(會計績效/市場績效) 對高階經理人超額激勵與固定薪酬之關係，此結果表示，資訊透明會削弱績效差之公司採用超額薪酬作為激勵手段之意圖。
This study aims to explore the impact of firm performance and information transparency on excess executive compensation. To conduct this research, no-financial firms listing in the Taiwan and Taipei Stock Exchanges in the period from 2012 to 2014 are used as the sample. The results shows that firms with poor market and accounting performance tend to use excess compensation to motivate top managers. However, increasing information transparency may reduce underperformed companies’ intention in using either excess fixed or excess incentive compensation as an incentive tool.
