本論文試圖論證雖然超值理論對含混性提供的語意學還算令人滿意，但實際上並未擺脫高階含混性的困擾。由於主張超值理論和其孿生系統次值理論的哲學家們，包括奇德•范恩(Kit Fine)和多米尼克•海棣(Dominic Hyde)都認為雖然高階含混性的確存在，但是高階含混性對超值理論並不會造成困擾。但是，我認為超值理論忽視高階含混性的策略並不成功，也就是說，高階含混性仍舊是待解的問題。為了能夠理解超值理論與高階含混性的關係，首先，我將分別說明高階含混性以及超值理論如何建構其語意學。接下來要澄清的則是超值理論為何仍然會遭遇高階含混性的問題。最後在論文中要呈現的則是超值理論並未解決高階含混性的問題。由於當代研究含混性議題的各種理論，除了超值理論與其孿生次值理論之外，其他進路如提姆斯•威廉森(Timothy Williamson)的知態理論以及羅珊娜•姬芙(Rosanna Keefe)的語用論，也都聲稱和超值理論有著相同結構的語意學，所以，說明超值理論的語意學和該理論可能遭遇的問題，顯然是處理含混性議題重要的起點。
The aim of this paper is to show that while supervaluationism provides a satisfactory semantics of vagueness, ipso facto the challenge of explaining higher-order vagueness still remains. Kit Fine-the first one to propose super-truth theory (i.e., the prototype of supervaluationism)-and Dominic Hyde-defender of subvaluationism-both contend that higher-order vagueness does not matter. I respectfully beg to differ and propose to argue that higher-order vagueness is not just a pseudo-problem and that we still need to need to formulate a satisfactory account. In making my case, first of all, I analyze the structure of higher-order vagueness and the basic functions of supervaluationism, respectively, then go on to indicate the main strategy deployed by the supervaluationists in dealing with higher-order vagueness. Again, I don't think that they have so far provided a satisfactory account that solves the problem. That is to say, while supervalutionists indeed propose a good semantics of vagueness in general, but they have not provided a solution to the higher-order vagueness problem.
Supervaluationism plays a crucial role in well-known contemporary theories of vagueness, including the epistemic theory and the pragmatic theory as well as subvaluationism itself. Advocates of such theories all claim to share the same pattern of approach with supervaluationism, thus, it is crucial to discuss the structure and problems of supervaluationism in order to tackle the problem of higher-order vagueness.
