企業如何操弄盈餘數字?盈餘門檻觀點之檢測

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题名:	企業如何操弄盈餘數字?盈餘門檻觀點之檢測 How do Managers Manipulate Earnings? The Perspective of Earnings Thresholds
作者:	林柏廷 Lin, Po-Ting
贡献者:	會計學系
关键词:	盈餘管理盈餘門檻零盈餘前期盈餘分析師預期盈餘 earnings management earnings thresholds zero earnings previous-period earnings analysts’ earnings forecasts
日期:	2015-06
上传时间:	2015-08-20 13:40:17 (UTC+8)
摘要:	為瞭解盈餘門檻對企業盈餘管理行為之影響，本研究參考Goh, Lee, and Lee (2013)之研究設計，分別檢測公司在微幅達成、大幅超越、以及大幅低於目標盈餘時之盈餘管理行為。實證結果指出，公司在微幅達成正向盈餘時，有明顯向上盈餘管理之行為，顯示當公司有機會將盈餘由「負」轉「正」時，會向上操作盈餘數字。而大幅虧損(大幅低於零盈餘門檻)公司，有明顯向下調整盈餘現象，顯示當公司面臨大幅虧損時，會傾向採取逆向操作方式(洗大澡行為)，以增加未來盈餘上漲空間。另盈餘大幅超越分析師預測值之公司，有明顯向上調整盈餘現象，顯示公司管理當局傾向透過大幅超越或打敗分析師預測值，以吸引投資人青睞。最後，本研究亦發現，微幅達成或大幅超越較多盈餘門檻之公司，有較明顯之向上盈餘管理行為，顯示公司面臨越多盈餘門檻時，會有越強烈之盈餘管理動機。 This study aims to investigate the impact of earnings thresholds on managers’ earnings manipulation behavior. Based on a design developed by Goh et al. (2013), this research examines earnings management behavior under the scenarios just made, clearly beat, and clearly missed. We find evidence that companies experience more upward earnings adjustments in cases where their earnings clearly exceed the analyst forecasts and where they have small positive reported earnings. Such results indicate that management attempts to clearly beat analysts’ expectations and avoid reporting negative earnings. Nevertheless, managers may downward adjust their earnings, i.e., big-bath behavior, in cases where their companies suffer huge losses. Moreover, this study provides show evidence showing that, in cases either earnings slightly or largely exceed earnings thresholds, the more earnings thresholds companies meet, the more tendency they may have to upward adjust earnings.
显示于类别:	[會計學系暨研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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