| 摘要: | 全球企業併購活動愈趨頻繁，併購的目的係發揮經營綜效產生效益及增進公司的經營績效，進而提升公司價值。然而，並非每個併購的案例都是成功的，企業雖期望藉由併購為公司帶來綜效，但也可能因文化差異造成成效不佳。從過去學者研究(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Yermack, 1996)來看，良好的公司治理可改善公司的績效，而企業也希望藉由進行併購而使公司的績效提升。因此，本研究探討合併公司其公司治理與績效的關係，及比較未進行合併之公司其公司治理與公司績效之影響。本研究對象為2007年至2013年進行合併的上市櫃公司，以最小平方法(ordinal least squares, OLS)來驗證其與績效之關係。實證結果可知：獨立董事席次、CEO雙重性、經理人薪酬、內部股東持股比例和政府機構持股比例會影響合併公司之財務績效；董事會規模、CEO雙重性和經理人薪酬會影響非合併公司之財務績效；董事會規模、獨立董事席次、CEO雙重性、經理人薪酬和內部股東持股比例會影響合併公司之市場績效；獨立董事席次和經理人薪酬會影響非合併公司之市場績效。
The mergers and acquisitions activities of global companies increase a lot frequently. The purpose of mergers and acquisitions are expected to generate operating synergies and to enhance the company’s operating efficiency, and thus to increase the value of the company. However, not every case of mergers and acquisitions is successful. Merger and acquisitions may fail because of cultural conflicts. Based on previous literature (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Yermack, 1996), the good corporate governance can improve the company’s performance. It is hoped that the good corporate governance can also improve the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, the study investigated the relationship between corporate governance and performance of mergers companies from 2007 to 2013. According to the empirical results of ordinal least squares regression (OLS), the conclusions are as follows. First, the size of independent directors, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board, the compensation of manager, the insider ownership and the government ownership are related financial performance of mergers companies; the size of board, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board and the compensation of manager are related financial performance of non-mergers companies. Second, the size of board, the size of independent directors, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board, the compensation of manager and the insider ownership are related market performance of mergers companies; the size of independent directors and the compensation of manager are related market performance of non-mergers companies. |
