English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 46962/50828 (92%)
造訪人次 : 12434684      線上人數 : 696
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋
    主頁登入上傳說明關於CCUR管理 到手機版


    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/29913


    題名: 審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊與有效的公司治理
    The Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees, and Effective Corporate Governance
    作者: 張芸豪
    貢獻者: 會計學系
    關鍵詞: 公司治理
    審計委員會
    薪酬委員會
    成員重疊
    corporate governance
    audit committee
    compensation committee
    overlapping membership
    日期: 2015-06
    上傳時間: 2015-07-09 15:44:45 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 隨著經濟環境的發展,企業透過設立功能性委員會執行公司治理已成為趨勢,其中審計委員會與薪酬委員會逐漸轉變為公司治理的核心,審計委員會的功能為監督與維持財務報導品質,薪酬委員會的功能為制定與監督管理階層之薪酬制度。審計及薪酬委員會為兩個功能不相同之委員會,若兩委員會成員重疊可能會提升或降低公司治理機制。
    本研究樣本期間以2011年至2013年台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,探討審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊與有效的公司治理,因知識外溢效果的關係,提升公司治理成效,反之,因成員搭便車之關係,可能降低公司治理成效。
    實證結果發現,知識外溢效果假說獲得支持;激勵性薪酬、機構投資人持股比例與審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊為顯著正向關係,顯示成員重疊能制定較佳之激勵性薪酬及遏止短期投資行為;總經理任期與審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊為顯著負向關係,顯示總經理更易做出正確的決策,增加公司經營績效。
    With the development of the economic environment, companies through establishing sub-committees to implementation of the corporate governance committee becoming a trend. Especially the audit committee and the compensation committee, which gradually transformed into the core of corporate governance, the function of the audit committee is to supervise and maintain the quality of financial reporting, the function of the compensation committee is to development and monitoring of the management compensation system. The audit and compensation committees are two different functions committee, it may raise or lower the corporate governance mechanism if the overlapping membership on the two committees.
    A sample consisting of listed and OTC companies trading in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2013. Discussion on the audit and compensation committee overlaps with effective corporate governance. Due to knowledge spillover improve corporate governance mechanism; on the contrary, because of the relationship between the members of free riding, it may reduce the corporate governance mechanism.
    The results show that knowledge spillovers support the hypothesis; incentive compensation and the proportion of institutional investors holding are significant positively associated with the overlap membership on audit and compensation committee, showing that the overlap membership can develop better incentive compensation and curb the behavior of short-term investments; CEO tenure is significant negative associated with the overlap membership on audit and compensation committee, showing that CEO more easily making the correct decisions to increase the company's operating performance.
    顯示於類別:[會計學系暨研究所 ] 博碩士論文

    文件中的檔案:

    檔案 描述 大小格式瀏覽次數
    index.html0KbHTML322檢視/開啟


    在CCUR中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.


    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回饋