| 摘要: | 本研究在於探討家族控制權與高階管理者超額酬勞之關聯性，以及檢測公司資訊透明度對此關係之影響。研究中以2011年至2013年台灣上市(櫃)公司為對象，以Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008)酬勞模式衡量超額酬勞。實證結果發現，控制股權與家族企業交乘項對高階管理者超額酬勞有正向影響，顯示家族企業特性會干擾控制股權與高階管理者超額酬勞之關係，支持核心代理問題之論點。另研究結果指出，控制股權、家族企業與資訊透明度交乘項對高階管理者超額酬勞有負向影響，顯示提高資訊透明度可降低家族企業下，股權控制對高階管理者超額酬勞之影響，進而降低肥貓問題。
This study aims to examine the impact of family-business characteristics, control ownership and information disclosures on excess top management compensation. To conduct this research, a sample consisting of listed and OTC companies trading in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2013 is used and the excess compensation model developed by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) is employed. The results show that the interaction variable of controlling ownership and family firms positively associated with excess top management compensation. Such results indicate that family-business characteristics alter the relationship between controlling ownership and excess top management compensation, in line with the argument of core-agency problems. In addition, the result shows that transparency moderates the impact of controlling ownership and family firms own excess top management compensation. This finding indicates that improving information transparency can reduce the impact of family-business characteristics on the relationship between controlling ownership and excess top management compensation, which may lead to mitigate the fat-cat problems. |
