本研究在於探討董事、CEO酬勞組合對公司後續績效之影響。研究中將樣本公司分為「高付董事酬勞/高付CEO酬勞」、「高付董事酬勞/低付CEO酬勞」、「低付董事酬勞/高付CEO酬勞」與「低付董事酬勞/低付CEO酬勞」四種組合，並檢測此四種經營型態公司，後續期間之資產報酬率與市場報酬率差異。實證結果發現，在激勵酬勞方面，「高付董事酬勞/高付CEO酬勞」、「高付董事酬勞/低付CEO酬勞」公司後續一期之資產報酬率與市場報酬率，顯著優於「低付董事酬勞/低付CEO酬勞」公司，顯示給予董事激勵酬勞對公司經營表現具有激勵作用，符合隱性合約之論點。然固定酬勞方面，「高付董事酬勞/高付CEO酬勞」、「高付董事酬勞/低付CEO酬勞」公司後續一期之市場報酬率，顯著低於「低付董事酬勞/低付CEO酬勞」公司，顯示給予高額固定酬勞並無助於公司績效之提升，容易造成肥貓現象。
This study aims to examine the impact of various combinations of board and CEO compensation on subsequent firm performance. To fulfil this purpose, I partition my sample firms into four groups, firms overpaying both directors and CEOs, underpaying both directors and CEOs, overpaying directors but underpaying CEOs, and underpaying directors but overpaying CEOs. The results show that firms paying incentive compensation to both directors and CEOs or overpaying directors but un-derpaying CEOs have higher market return and return on assets in the subsequent years compared to firms underpaying both directors and CEOs. Such results indicate that incentive compensation serves as a force driving top management to work harder. However, this study also shows that firms offering extra fixed pay to both directors and COEs or overpaying directors but underpaying CEOs have lower subsequent performance than firms underpaying both directors and CEOs. Such findings indicate that awarding extra fixed compensation cannot help promote performance, which may lead to fat-cat problems.
