| 摘要: | 本論文採用工資談判理論的觀點，以工資是由廠商與工會共同協商決定來處理。於總合供給面，結合Salop(1979)的效率工資異動成本模型以及McDonald and Solow(1981)的工會談判模型，建構綜合效率工資與工會談判的理論架構，藉以討論不完全競爭的勞動市場之總體意涵，並進一步將封閉體系延伸至開放體系，藉此開放模型來討論貶值的產出效果。此外，當物價內生化之後，我們探討將一般物價平減後的實質工資與失業救濟金隨工資與一般物價做指數化調整納入考量後的貶值產出緊縮效果。其主要結果有二：(1)當名目失業救濟金完全不隨名目工資做指數化調整，卻隨一般物價做完全指數化的調整時，會使貶值對產出有緊縮之效果。(2)當名目失業救濟金隨名目工資做完全指數化調整，卻完全不隨一般物價做指數化調整時，貶值既可能使產出發生緊縮效果亦可能對產出造成擴張的效果。
This paper adopts the point of view of the wage bargaining model, the decision make by the union and the firms negotiate an efficient wage-employment contract. In the supply side, we apply the turnover cost model (Salop 1979) merge with the efficient bargaining model (McDonald and Solow 1981). To propose an integration of efficiency wages and wage bargaining theoretical model, first we discuss the implication of labor market in the imperfect competition market, and then extend the model to open economy, by which we discuss the contractionary effects of a currency devaluation. In addition to, we discuss the nominal unemployment benefits are assumed to be indexed to either the nominal wage or the general price level. Finally, we get two main conclusions: (1)When the nominal unemployment benefits are not fully indexed to the nominal wage, but are fully indexed to the general price level, a currency devaluation shows contractionary effects. (2) When the nominal unemployment benefits are fully indexed to the nominal wage, but are not fully indexed to the general price level, a currency devaluation shows either contractionary or expansionary effects. |
