近年來,我國資本市場中,機構投資人的投資比例逐年上升,唯過去研究對機構投資人的看法並不一致,一種觀點認為,機構投資人能夠發揮監督功能,降低企業盈餘管理行為並提升資訊揭露程度;另一種觀點認為,機構投資人基於自身利益而損害企業公司治理。
為探究目前我國機構投資人對企業進行盈餘管理與資訊揭露之影響為何,本研究以台灣經濟新報(TEJ)資料庫所取得之機構投資人持股比率與資訊揭露評鑑等級及盈餘管理變數進行實證,以季為單位,蒐集我國2011及2012年上市櫃公司為樣本,剔除資料缺漏、異常、極端值,共10,087筆樣本資料。實證結果發現,機構投資人中,外資及投信會促使企業進行向上盈餘操縱;投信在企業進行向下盈餘操縱時,會發生抑制的情形,為了降低自身投資損失,而發揮監督的效果。我國機構投資人較偏向於短期機構投資人,較注重短期獲利情形,並不在意企業之資訊揭露,甚至會有抑制的情形發生。
Previous studies indicated that institutional investors are the major traders in the capital markets in other developed countries. In recent years, the proportion of insti-tutional investors is increasing. Thus, the impact of Taiwan's capital market is growing. The influence by institutional investors is more powerful on the capital markets. However, prior studies shown that the effect on corporate governance is ambiguous for earnings management.
This study classifies the institutional investors as foreign investors, securities investment trust companies and dealers to examine the effects on earnings manage-ment and informational disclosure about institutional investor. The empirical results as: (1) the percent of foreign investors and investment trusts are significantly positive with upwards earnings management; the percent of investment trusts is significantly negative with downward earnings management. (2) The institutional investors are more short-sighted than other investors, they would sacrifice the value of information disclosure else focuses on short-term self-benefit, even to inhibit the company’s in-formation disclosure.