文化大學機構典藏 CCUR:Item 987654321/28341
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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/28341


    Title: 台灣上市櫃公司的公司治理特徵與盈餘穩健性之關聯性:以C-Score衡量
    The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Earnings Conservatism for Taiwan Listed Companies: Using C-Score
    Authors: 李佳蓓
    Lee, Chia-Pei
    Contributors: 會計學系
    Keywords: 公司治理
    盈餘穩健性
    C-Score
    corporate governance
    earnings conservatism
    Date: 2014-06
    Issue Date: 2014-09-30 17:31:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究在於探討台灣上市櫃公司的公司治理特徵與盈餘穩健性之關聯性,並以C-Score衡量。本研究係以臺灣2009年至2012年之上市櫃公司為研究對象,盈餘穩健性是採用C-Score
    衡量個別企業年度穩健性。
    實證結果顯示,CEO雙重性、獨立董事比率、經理人持股比率、董事持股比率以及大股東持股比率與盈餘穩健性呈現顯著負相關。董事會規模以及偏離程度與盈餘穩健性呈現顯著正相關。董事持股比率與家族企業的交乘項對盈餘穩健性呈現顯著正相關。實證結果說明,董事會專業能力強,監督效率高,因此管理階層不易支配董事會,同時股東也越有誘因去監督公司的管理階層,使得盈餘穩健性上升。當管理階層持股比率越高時,基於自我利益和鞏固自身權利的動機之下,管理階層會
    過度的操弄盈餘,降低公司績效,使盈餘不具穩健性。
    This paper investigate that the relationship between Corporate Governance and Earnings Conservatism for Taiwan Listed Companies, and using C-Score measure. The research periods are from 2009 to 2012, and the sample is the listed companies of Taiwan. Earnings conservatism uses C-Score to measure the conservatism of the individual enterprises.
    The empirical results show that CEO duality, the ratio of independent directors, manager shareholding ratio, ratio of shareholding directors and the ratio of major shareholders have the significant negative correlation with earnings conservatism, the size of the board and the degree of deviation have the significant positively correlation with earnings conservatism. Empirical results indicate that board of professional ability and supervision efficiency high, the management is not easy to control the board, but also the more incentive to monitor the management, making the rise in earnings conservatism. When the ratio of management shareholding higher, based on self-interest and consolidate their motivation, management will be excessive manipulation of earnings, reduce corporate performance, so that the surplus does not have stability.
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting & Graduate Institute of Accounting] Thesis

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