本研究在於探討經營型態、薪酬委員會對管理者異常薪酬之影響。研究中以2012年台灣上市公司為對象，採Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008)異常薪酬模式衡量管理者異常薪酬。實證結果發現，「具大專教師且專技資格委員比率」與管理者異常薪酬呈負向關係，顯示當薪酬委員會成員中，兼具大專教師資格及專技資格委員比例愈高時，公司愈不會給予管理者超額酬勞。另外，本研究亦發現，經營型態對上述關係具有干擾效果。實證結果顯示，採管家型態經營之企業(相對於採代理經營型態者)，其薪酬委員專業性對管理者異常薪酬有較低之影響。此實證結果隱含，企業經營模式(代理或管家)會影響薪酬委員會運作，管家型態經營方式下，薪酬委員會對管理者薪酬會有較少之限制。
This study aims to examine the impact of compensation committee, governance style on managers’ abnormal compensation. To conduct this research, a sample consisting of listed companies trading in the Taiwan Stock Market in 2012 are used as investigated subjects and the abnormal compensation model developed by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) is used to determine abnormal compensation. The findings indicate that abnormal management compensation is negatively associated with the ratio of committee members concurrently having professorship and professional credientials. Such a result shows that companies with higher professional qualificationns are less likely to allow their managers to have abnormal compensation. In addition, ths research finds that governace style is a moderating variable. The results demonstrate that companies adopting stewardship governance operations have less abnormal management compensation, compared to thoses with a agency governance style. Such results imply that governance styles affect the operations of the remuneration committee and that the committee under the seyle of stewardship governace gives less restrictions on their managemet compensation.
