本研究係以上海證券交易所A股之上市公司為樣本，並分為國有企業及非國有企業兩組，探討高階主管薪酬與在職消費對公司經營績效的影響。實證結果發現，國有企業在職消費愈高，公司經營績效愈低；國有企業比非國有企業在職消費對經營績效有較顯著影響；國有企業高階主管薪酬愈高，公司經營績效愈高；高階主管薪酬對公司經營績效之影響，國有企業高於非國有企業。另外，研究亦發現，無論是國有企業或非國有企業的公司規模與每股盈餘皆有顯著的正相關。
從研究發現結果來看，如何設計出短期激勵計畫與長期激勵計畫相結合的高階主管薪酬制度，當有助於提高公司的經營績效。因此，此等議題是中國大陸上市公司所有者(股東)應值得深思的。
The samples of this study are from A-shares of listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The data are separated into two groups. One is state-owned and the other is non-state-owned. The study investigates the influences of top executive compensation and on the job consumption of operational performance. The empirical results suggest that the state-owned enterprises have higher on the job consumption, the worse operational performance they would have. With regard to the influence of operational performance, the state-owned enterprises on the job consumption are more than the non-state-owned enterprises. The empirical evidences indicate that the state-owned enterprises have more the top executive compensation, the higher operational performance they would have. The state-owned enterprises have more influence on top executive compensation in operational performance than the non-state-owned enterprises. In addition, the empirical results suggest that there is a significant positive relationship between corporate size and earnings per share for the state-owned enterprises and the non-state-owned enterprises.
The empirical results imply that how to design and to combine the short and long-term incentives on top executive compensation system are beneficial to improve the operational performance. Therefore, the owners (shareholders) of China’s listed companies need to contemplate these issues.
