本文主要目的在於檢視董監獎酬與關係人交易之關聯性。關係人交易到底是增進營運效率的工具，或是公司當局操縱損益及其他關係人利益輸送之管道，長久以來引起廣泛爭論，實證上並未獲得一致性結果。此外法規僅針對發生弊案之少部分交易進行管控，是否存在管理上其他系統性的問題，使得關係人交易值得作進一步之研究。本文從獎酬契約觀點檢測關係人交易產生之原因。研究結果發現關係人銷貨加工收入、關係人進貨外包加工費用、關係人營業外收入、關係人營業外費用、關係人應收帳款票據、關係人應付帳款票據及應付關係人融資皆與主要檢測變數董監事酬勞呈顯著正相關。此結果顯示董監獎酬愈大，關係人交易項目金額仍是愈大，因此，董監事領取了來自關係人交易的超額報酬，關係人交易產生原因並非因內部交易的利益可以增加股東利潤。換言之，關係人交易是代理問題的另一個表象而已。
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between director compen-sation and related party transactions (RPT). It’s a long term debate that directors and executives use related party transactions to improve the efficiency of operation or to manipulate earnings and transfer interests . However, there hasn’t been any consistent empirical result. Besides the regulations only supervise a few fraction of transactions which has frauds. It is worthy of further research toward the related party transaction whether there is any other systematic problem in management. Based on compensation arrangements perspective and agency theory, the study investigates the determinants of related party transactions. Our results indicates that RPT net sales, RPT COGS, RPT non-operating revenue, RPT non-operating expense, RPT accounts receivable, RPT ac-counts payable, payable to RP are significantly positively associated with director com-pensation. It reveals that the amount of related party transaction increases when director compensation increases. Hence, related party transactions result from the executives acquiring excessive compensation, not from adding profits to the shareholders wealth. In other words, related party transactions present the increase in agency problem.
