Technology licensing, R&D and welfare

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Title:	Technology licensing, R&D and welfare
Authors:	Chang, RY (Chang, Ray-Yun) Hwang, H (Hwang, Hong) Peng, CH (Peng, Cheng-Hau)
Contributors:	Dept Econ
Keywords:	Technology licensing R&D investment Social welfare
Date:	2013-02
Issue Date:	2014-03-03 10:39:52 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper sets up a three-stage (R&D, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which only one of the firms undertakes a cost-reducing R&D and may license the developed technology to the others by means of a two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit royalty and an upfront fee) contract. It is found with surprise that if the licensor firm's R&D efficiency is high, the availability of licensing subdues the firm's R&D incentive, leading to a lower social welfare level. This result implies that a government has to be cautious when encouraging technology licensing among firms. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Relation:	ECONOMICS LETTERS Volume: 118 Issue: 2 Pages: 396-399
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Economics & Graduate Institute of Economics ] journal articles

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