LEGAL TRANSPLANT, LEGAL ORIGIN, AND ANTITRUST EFFECTIVENESS

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Title:	LEGAL TRANSPLANT, LEGAL ORIGIN, AND ANTITRUST EFFECTIVENESS
Authors:	Ma, TC (Ma, Tay-Cheng)
Contributors:	Dept Econ
Keywords:	EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS COMMON-LAW FINANCE ENDOWMENTS SELECTION GROWTH RIGHTS POLICY
Date:	2013-03
Issue Date:	2014-02-27 13:06:26 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This article shows that, in the process of antitrust transplant, the impact of legal tradition on antitrust effectiveness depends on whether or not the country is receptive to the transplanted antitrust regime. A successful antitrust transplant requires institutional structures in host countries that are able to support and maintain transplanted laws. If the transplant country fails to meet this institutional requirement, then the enforcement of competition law will have a very limited effect in regard to improving market competition, and its transplantation will be neither harmful nor helpful in terms of law enforcement. At this point, regardless of the legal tradition in which the antitrust judiciary appears, there is little correlation between legal origin and antitrust effectiveness.
Relation:	JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS Volume: 9 Issue: 1 Pages: 65-88
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Economics & Graduate Institute of Economics ] journal articles

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