| 題名: | The function of independent directors with different payoff rules: the issue of shareholder activism |
| 作者: | Wang, MC (Wang, Mao-Chang)
Chiu, ST (Chiu, Shih-Tsung) |
| 貢獻者: | Dept Accounting |
| 關鍵詞: | auditor
corporate governance
different payoff rules
game theory
independent director
shareholder activism |
| 日期: | 2013-09-01 |
| 上傳時間: | 2014-02-24 16:59:13 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | We discuss the function of independent directors with different payoff rules in situations where firms must fund by equity capital in an environment of corporate governance, and we examine the strategic choices of managers, auditors and independent directors. This paper applies game theory. The main results show that (a) the auditor and the independent director can raise the possibility of managers choosing beneficial projects; (b) corporate governance can induce managers to report honestly, and impel the independent director to maintain independence; (c) under fixed payoffs, the independent director can maintain independence more easily and (d) the independent director who maintains independence can solve information asymmetry problems. The analytical results imply that the effectiveness of independent directors is assisted in resolving agency problems, and the payoff rules of independent directors are problems that must be considered. |
| 關聯: | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Volume: 24 Issue: 15 Pages: 3020-3030 |
| 顯示於類別: | [會計學系暨研究所 ] 期刊論文
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