財務舞弊事件可能會對公司的聲譽及形象造成負面之影響，亦會造成投資者對於公司的財報失去信心。而董事會在監督財報上扮演重要的角色，會計重編代表董事的監督品質較低。本研究的研究重點為若一家公司發生重編，此訊息亦可能產生傳染效果，則與該事件公司具有共同董事的被傳染公司在事件窗期內，可能也會受到池魚之殃。
此外，本研究提出其他假說，進一步探討上述效果是否受到董事任期、年齡與教育程度來弱化負向股價效應。我們發現，重編公司在宣告重編事件五天後，平均的異常股價報酬為負，在統計學上達95%的顯著水準。
而在多變量分析中，結果顯示，共同董事之任期越長、年齡與教育程度越高均對股價的異常報酬有弱化之現象，惟統計結果上僅部分顯著。
Financial fraud (e.g. restatement) has a material adverse effect on firms’ reputation and image, and then suffers a negative impact on investors’ perception of the financial reporting quality of a firm. Given the role of the board in monitoring financial reporting, accounting restatements reflect a lower quality in the monitoring role of the directors. Our study focuses on examining whether a contagion firm that has a common director with a restating firm suffers market price decline within a short window period sur-rounding the restatement announcement of the restating firm; that is, whether there is an information transfer effect of restatements through common directorships.
Besides, we propose other additional hypotheses. We argue that the negative stock price reactions at the contagion firms when the corresponding restating firms announce restatements are more pronounced if the age, tenure and educational attainment of the common director at the contagion firms are lower. We find that contagion firms experi-ence a mean size-adjusted abnormal return of 95 percent over a five-day window sur-rounding the restatement dates of the restating firms, and this negative mean abnormal return is statistically significant.
Further, in the multivariate analyses, we find that the abnormal returns are lower if the common director of the contagion firm (1) is older, (2)has longer tenure, or (3) has longer educational attainment, but the results are just partially statistical significant.
