台灣法規放寬募集資金的規定，使得私募成為台灣上市櫃公司重要的籌資方式，雖然讓企業籌措資金簡便快速，但公司內部人可能將私募做為謀取私利的工具。本研究使用折價幅度、私募發行股數佔原股本比例、繳款日距離股東會決議日的時間、公司內部應募人在私募完成前後三個月內出售其原有持股，這四指標來衡量原股東的利益受到私募所侵犯的程度，並探究其與公司治理之關聯性。本研究以2005年至2013年的上市公司為樣本，結果顯示內部人應募金額比率與私募的折價幅度呈顯著正相關。董事持股比率與折價幅度呈顯著負相關。應募人取得董事、監察人與私募股數比例呈顯著正相關。監察人持股率與繳款日距離股東會日期呈顯著正相關。公司設有獨立董事者與兩個指標(私募折價幅度、私募應募人出售老股)皆呈顯著負相關。大股東持股比率與兩個指標(私募股數比例、私募應募人出售老股)呈顯著正相關。實證結果說明了公司中大股東股份越高即控制權越高，越有機會能讓私募門檻通過，進而操縱私募程序來圖利，內部應募人應募金額越高，使其越有動機藉私募圖利自身。而上市公司設有獨立董事者，的確能有監督的功能降低利益掠奪效果的發生。
Private placement is important Financing for listed companies in Taiwan. Regula-tions of private placement been relaxed that allows enterprises not only financing for simple and fast but also the insider exploited private placement for personal gain, but shall not cancel private placement simply for fear of having possible risks that loss of bring competitiveness for the company. This study used four indicators, respectively price discount and private equity ratio and the timing of payments and insiders sell old stock that to measure the original shareholder interests are the extent of violations of the private placement to explore their relationship with the corporate governance. Empirical research found to investment ratio of inside investor and the two indicators are highly significant positive correlation in 2005-2013 listed companies sample. Obtain the di-rectors or supervisors and private equity ratio is a significant positive correlation. Inde-pendent directors of the company and the two indicators are highly significant negative correlation. Largest shareholding ratio and the two indicators are highly significant pos-itive correlation. The results show that the control over of substantial shareholders in the company higher have the opportunity to make private placement by manipulation of the private placement program to make gains. The listed companies with independent di-rectors indeed supervised function to reduce the occurrence of interests predatory ef-fect.
